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 The purpose of this research paper is to shed light on the feasibility and implications 
concerning the introduction of single-pilot operations on air transport category aircraft. As 
technology has been advancing over the past few decades, autonomous artificial intelligence 
software has started to become more popular, finding higher demands in various industries. With 
current issues such as the pilot shortage and raising pilot wages, airlines are looking for ways to 
cut down on costs and preserve a healthy work force level. The implementation of this artificial 
intelligence technology on the aircraft flight deck provides a potential solution to this problem. 
On a functional level, this software could easily prove to take on many of the tasks that current 
pilots face. There are, however, other considerations that play a large role in the overall 
feasibility of its implementation, most notably the human factors aspect of removing the first 
officer. Due to these human factors concerns, the likelihood that this technology can be 
incorporated effectively is improbable. 
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Introduction 
 With an increase in consumer demand for air transportation, continuous creation and 
expansion of commercial airliners, and the unrelenting call for more qualified crewmembers in 
the current pilot shortage, commercial airlines are looking to cut costs while also improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. It is estimated that the annual growth rate of 
passenger traffic is to rise at a rate of 4.8 percent over the next 20 years which will contribute to 
higher aircraft production demands (Deliotte, 2017). This demand will require airlines to hire 
more than 250,000 qualified pilots until 2037 to meet this growth (Boeing, 2017). The 
consequence of this increased crew demand equates to addition costs in recruitment, training, 
retention, and salary pay. With these looming figures the airlines are likely to seek out various 
cost-cutting techniques in order to offset the expenses associated with this growth. While there 
are a variety of ways to cut costs in the industry, one in particular could prove to not only boost 
annual net income but also potentially solve, or greatly diminish, the pilot shortage. By 
introducing single-pilot operations for Part 121 air transportation operators, the pilot crew 
requirements can be halved along with a decrease in expenses needed to recruit and train these 
individuals. The advances in onboard avionics systems have allowed for air transport aircraft to 
become highly automated, enabling the system to conduct almost every phase of flight 
autonomously. With such capabilities it is an enticing prospect for the airlines to move toward 
this shift. However, should this transition take place, the safety impact could prove to be 
compromising. 
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Historical Perspective 
 As aviation evolved from its early conceptions throughout the 20th century, its complex 
nature also began to shift. During the pre-jet era, aircraft would require a crew of five individuals 
including: two pilots, a flight engineer, a navigator, and a radio operator. This crew size would 
shrink expeditiously once jet aircraft and other advances in radio communications and 
navigational aid technology were realized. The radio operator and navigator became obsolete 
(Fadden, Lindberg, Morton, & Taylor, 2008). It was during the 1960s that the three-person crew, 
captain, first officer, and flight engineer, was the norm. 
 The flight engineer’s main task within the three-person crew was to monitor and operate 
complex aircraft systems such as pressurization and fuel consumption. The captain and first 
officer’s focus was navigation, aircraft control, and communication. Jet aircraft systems and 
operations simplified in-flight adjustments and troubleshooting failures were significantly 
reduced (Fadden, Lindberg, Morton, & Taylor, 2008). Due to this increase in engine reliability, 
in contrast to its piston-engine predecessor, jet aircraft now completed most of the work 
delegated to the flight engineer. Upon the advent of the Boeing 737, Boeing’s team of 
researchers and engineers looked into the performance and accident history of previous airplane 
designs in order to maximize effectiveness and safety for its new aircraft. The conclusions 
indicated that in-flight troubleshooting sometimes led to more serious problems, with the flight 
engineer’s intense focus on system problems often distracting one or both of the pilots. 
Furthermore, jet engine reliability was much higher than piston engines, requiring little to no 
flight troubleshooting or adjustment (Fadden, Lindberg, Morton, & Taylor, 2008). Due to the 
advances in aircraft systems, paired with the efficiencies and reliability they carried with them, 
airlines would eventually come to render the flight engineer obsolete. 
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Methods of Implementation 
 Before implementation of single-pilot operation (SPO) technology can be put into place, 
the current dual-pilot operation hierarchy and responsibility gradient must be analyzed. Current 
operations see a two-pilot team consisting of one pilot flying and another pilot monitoring the 
flight. The pilot flying takes responsibility of directing the aircraft in line with the approved 
flight plan and continuously monitors the flight path for any deviations. In the next seat over, the 
pilot not flying primarily focuses on navigating, controlling and monitoring radio 
communications, cross monitoring the actions of the pilot flying, assisting in high workload 
situations, and taking over flight tasks in the event that the other pilot is incapacitated (Bassien-
Capsa, Lim, Liu, Ramasamy, & Sabatini, 2017). 
 Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations outlines these tasks in a legal sense, requiring 
that a minimum flight crew must be established so that safe operations may be conducted, taking 
into consideration the workload on individual crewmembers, the accessibility and ease of 
operation of necessary controls by the appropriate crewmember, and the kinds of operations 
authorized under 14 CFR 25.1525 (Minimum Flight Crew, 2017). Essentially, for a transport-
category flight to be legal, the flight must consist of a crew that can balance workload such that 
neither crewmember is overwhelmed, and controls are accessible to either crewmember who is 
responsible for such control manipulation. Presently, few transport category aircraft with three 
required crewmembers are in use by major U.S. airlines. All modern transport aircraft, including 
the super-jumbo A-380 , are flown by only two flight crewmembers. 
 A key concept to dual-pilot operations is crew resource management (CRM). CRM is an 
essential component to safe, proper, and successful execution of flight tasks. In order for 
operations between crewmembers to be successful, attitude is perhaps the most important 
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variable (Garland, Hopkin, & Wise, 1999). Both pilots must display a positive, interdependent 
attitude to ensure that communication is both coherent and effective. It could be argued that their 
own personal performance is a hallmark of this positive attitude. Ultimately, proper group 
processes promulgate from appropriate CRM, resulting in effective team functioning which 
include clear communication, task delegation, and situation awareness (Garland, Hopkin, & 
Wise, 1999, p. 196). By utilizing the skills, knowledge, and experience of the other pilot, 
appropriate decision-making is more successful and task delegation is more effective. 
 Given the crucial nature that CRM bears on the ability for a flight to be conducted safely, 
it stands to reason that always having at least two crew members on the flight deck is necessary. 
Taking a look back at the regulations set forth by the FAA, it is specified that all large 
commercial aircraft are required to be flown by a flight crew consisting of not less than two 
pilots (Composition of Flight Crew, 2017). However, it is also specified by authorities that the 
aircraft must be capable of a single pilot operating the flight fully in either seat (Bassien-Capsa, 
Lim, Liu, Ramasamy, & Sabatini, 2017). This essentially means that there are already SPO 
elements in the design of current flight decks. 
 Looking toward the actual implementation of SPO for transport category operations, each 
of the two-pilot tasks will require a new distribution between man and machine. Whereas with 
dual-pilot operations the pilot flying ensures that the aircraft is in line with the flight plan and 
corrects for any deviations (with the pilot not flying taking care of all other communication and 
navigation tasks), SPO has the single pilot assume a strictly supervisory role (Bassien-Capsa, 
Lim, Liu, Ramasamy, & Sabatini, 2017). Ultimately, the one pilot would monitor the automated 
systems controlled by the artificial intelligence system (AI), and coordinate required tasks with a 
ground crew. Currently, both pilots require constant communication with one another. With the 
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proposed system, however, most of the interactions on the flight deck are between a human and a 
written software. This does not wholly cancel the need for CRM. Besides the coordination 
between the pilot and air traffic control, ground crews, and potentially other aircraft, there must 
still be an interaction between the pilot and AI controlling the flight. This comes in the form of 
human machine teaming (HMT). 
 HMT would require that output results are comparable to that seen in successful CRM. 
This means that some of the key ergonomic elements to be considered for system design include: 
facility of learning and remembering key functions, efficiency and intuitiveness of using 
automated functions, and avoidance/reduction of pilot-induced errors (Bassien-Capsa, Lim, Liu, 
Ramasamy, & Sabatini, 2017). The AI system would need to learn, communicate, and correct 
deviations much like that of a second crewmember. 
 In order for such functions to occur at the desired level of safety and accuracy, designers 
have conceived the Virtual Pilot Assistance (VPA) system. The main objectives of VPA are to 
decrease pilot workload, decrease flight deck complexity, increase aircraft surveillance capacity, 
and facilitate collaborative work and information sharing between the aircraft, air traffic control, 
and ground crews (Bassien-Capsa, Lim, Liu, Ramasamy, & Sabatini, 2017). The four major 
systems comprising VPA are communications, surveillance, flight management/control, and 
human-machine interface (HMI) systems. Each of these bear essential functions, but it is the 
HMI system, more specifically utilized as a cognitive human-machine interface, that is of 
particular significance when it comes to successful implementation of SPO. 
 In order for the system to evaluate pilot workload management, stress levels, fatigue, and 
incapacitation, the cognitive human-machine interface incorporates psychophysiological sensors 
which monitors pilot vitals in real time. This means that the pilot would be physically wired to 
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the machine. The system itself incorporates adaptive learning, meaning that through its 
evaluation of the pilot’s vitals, changes can be made to the surrounding environment (refer to 
Appendix A). These changes can include transition to higher levels of system automation, 
reducing screen clutter, and transferring noncritical tasks to the ground crew (Bassien-Capsa, 
Lim, Liu, Ramasamy, & Sabatini, 2017). In the event of pilot incapacitation, the system will go 
into a fully automated state. An alert will be sent to the ground crew and a link will be set up 
between the aircraft and a ground operator who can then remotely pilot the aircraft to a safe 
location for landing. 
  





 From a functionality standpoint, VPA captures a competent level of autonomy, factors in 
appropriate failsafe technology, and diminishes task saturation on the part of the pilot during 
stressful situations. That being said, physical functionality is only one piece of the puzzle that 
embodies the successful implementation of this technology. The human factors considerations, 
or how the implementation of this technology will affect the pilot, the ground crew, air traffic 
control, etc., is of the highest importance in determining whether or not it is feasible to employ. 
 As mentioned earlier, when initial training first began for CRM in the 1980s, research 
determined that the most critical components for success between crewmembers and the safe 
conduct of the flight was highly dependent upon the attitude of the team. Without a cohesive 
relationship between the crewmembers, the likelihood of an effective flight is lessened. Two 
crewmember working together with a positive, professional relationship on the flight deck can 
achieve much more together than either one of them alone. This enhanced ability to conduct an 
effective flight manifests itself in seven particular team processes. These include: (1) leadership, 
(2) communication, (3) assertiveness, (4) situation awareness, (5) mission analysis or planning, 
(6) adaptability, and (7) decision making (Garland, Hopkin, & Wise, 1999). While leadership 
and decision making tend to be skills that put more emphasis on the captain of a two person 
crew, giving greater definition to the intracockpit authority gradient (this will be discussed in 
more detail later), the remaining five skills should see a relatively equal level of competency 
among all pilot crewmembers. Both pilots should complement one another’s skills in these 
emphasis areas, allowing for more coherent communication, enhanced situation awareness, and 
easier adaptability. 
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 Crewmembers also hold the responsibility of keeping one another informed of flight 
status as well as taking note of the other pilot’s ability to handle tasks. The United States Army 
Aviation Center identified key roles that pilots should perform in their interaction with one 
another, emphasizing situation awareness. These include responsibilities such as routinely 
updating one another concerning flight status and external factors, anticipation of the situation 
awareness needs of the other pilot, holding awareness of the physical and mental state of the 
other pilot, communicating personal problems, and requesting needed information (Garland, 
Hopkin, & Wise, 1999). Many of these responsibilities are significant with respect to the 
affective domain of human intelligence. Being able to interpret the other pilot’s body language, 
demeanor, and overall stress levels is crucial for proper and appropriate communication to take 
place between pilot crewmembers. With this level of communication between the two, the flight 
will be more conducive for success. 
  




 The implementation of CRM principles proved to enhance pilot effectiveness on the 
flight deck, leading to safer and more efficient flight operations. It ultimately created a 
relationship within the cockpit based upon trust, respect, and recognition of authority. In essence, 
the two pilots merged together as one entity made of two shared minds which could perform far 
greater tasks than if they were separate. So what would happen if this entity were split in half 
with a machine taking over where a human operator once stood? 
 Task delegation must first be taken into account. A single pilot taking a predominantly 
supervisory role with the machine covering a majority of the operational tasks could prove to 
skew the balance of power on the flight deck. While in current dual-pilot operations the autopilot 
system is used throughout most of cruising, climbing, and descending flight, this new technology 
will enable the aircraft to essentially perform all operations completely autonomous from the 
pilot. This includes takeoffs, landings, and taxi. If the pilot begins to feel as though they are just 
along for the ride to “chaperone” the system, the intuitiveness of task delegation may begin to 
become ambiguous. Furthermore, problems such as complacency may begin to affect the pilot 
community due to lack of flight responsibility on their part. If they are not flying the airplane 
they may as well just be a passenger. 
 A seemingly easy fix to this problem would be for the pilot to take commanding authority 
over the aircraft during various operations whether it be taxi, takeoff, cruise, or landing. With 
current operations, if a pilot seeks to control the aircraft they simply turn off the autopilot. 
However, the proposed SPO systems may not allow for deactivation. Automation degradation, or 
the reduction in the amount of automation authority used to control the flight, can be thought of 
as a beneficiary to the pilot as optimizing task allocation can quickly fluctuate when flight 
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conditions change (Risukhin, 2001). Given that a machine lacks judgement as a result of prior 
experiences, incorporating a level of automation degradation can prove to be lifesaving to the 
pilot who recognizes a situation that the computer does not. Perhaps an AI system could be 
programmed to “learn” from situations it encounters, but judgement is a dynamic process. As per 
the Oxford English Dictionary, judgement can be defined as “the formation of a conclusion 
concerning something, especially following careful consideration or deliberation” (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2018). A machine can be programmed to analyze situations, but it is 
ultimately utilized to fulfill its mission (in this case getting passengers from Point A to Point B). 
Passenger safety would arguably be another programmable feature, but what happens when 
passenger safety and mission completion conflict? While more research will need to be 
completed to answer this question, it currently stands that a pilot with autonomous judgement 
and empathy can best analyze and correct for nonstandard situations that occur in-flight. 
 Based upon the proposed setup of SPO, this concept of automation degradation appears 
to work in reverse. With the cognitive human-machine interface interwoven as part of HMT, it is 
the computer which is analyzing the human, not the other way around. This raises serious 
concerns about intracockpit authority gradient, or who holds the greater authority and how 
drastic the difference is. In a dual-pilot operation, it is the captain who should hold a higher 
authority than the first officer, but it should not be to the point where the captain is an 
authoritarian figure. Rather, he generally has the final say on situations but will listen attentively 
and open-mindedly to the first officer’s suggestions. In the case of the cognitive human-machine 
interface, the pilot has limited say on whether or not they need greater automation. The system 
will change based upon what it interprets the pilot needs (Bassien-Capsa, Lim, Liu, Ramasamy, 
& Sabatini, 2017). 
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 Looking back at the responsibilities of a two person crew as it relates to the status of the 
flight, it is each crewmember’s duty to assess the physical and mental state of the other pilot and 
provide assistance where it is needed. While at first glance this may seem identical to the role of 
the machine, humans can talk to one another. They can communicate what they need done 
verbally and visually. Monitoring vitals may provide a glimpse at the pilot’s ability to handle the 
situation but it is not the whole picture. The machine lacks empathy whereas a human does not. 
Furthermore, vital conditions vary from person to person. A singular calibration of this software 
lacks the ability to discriminate appropriately between individuals of different body types and 
levels of fitness. It could potentially take over on all tasks for an individual it determines is in a 
state of distress when they are completely calm and ready to tackle whatever task is before them. 
 Another serious questions that will have to be asked is whether or not pilots are willing to 
expose their vital information to this machine. While studies are yet to be conducted on this 
particular front, it is likely that at least some portion of the pilot population would not be 
comfortable strapping these software probes onto their body. It could be perceived as a violation 
of privacy and a force which could serve to create more stress than would be present without it. 
If pilots rejected to expose their vitals would the automation still be able to function? How would 
this impact task delegation and flight deck authority? Ethically speaking, VPA could prove to be 
exceedingly difficult to fully implement. 
  




 Implementation of SPO technology will also carry its fair share of new environmental 
considerations for the pilot, most notably with the ground operator. While interaction with 
individuals on the flight deck will be minimized with installation of the Virtual Pilot Assistance 
system, there will still exist a human interaction element. This comes in the external form of a 
ground crew or ground operator. This would truly be a new and unique element of 
communication and interaction as all prior forms of external person-to-person contact would be 
with air traffic control, other aircraft, or the airline dispatcher, all of whom have no physical 
control over the aircraft. By introducing an isolated human that can take control over the aircraft 
from an undisclosed operation center new concerns are created. 
 In their “Roadmap” to the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the 
National Airspace System, the FAA has identified certain areas of emphasis pertaining to human 
factors. These concerns include trust levels between the ground operator and pilot in the aircraft, 
effective human-automation interaction via the ground station, definition of roles and 
responsibilities, and airspace users’ and providers’ qualification and training, to name a few 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2013). Perhaps one of the more pressing issues concerns when 
the ground operator would have authorization to take control of the aircraft. While the system is 
designed to transfer control over to the ground operator upon pilot incapacitation, the system 
code could potentially be written to allow external override abilities in the event of hijacking or 
immediate need for outside intervention. This creates an entirely new spectrum for intracockpit 
authority gradient as now the pilot must exercise a role of authority with a machine and an 
individual perhaps hundreds of miles away (refer to Appendix B). In this case, it may be that the 
pilot does not hold the greatest authority. Perhaps they even hold the least. 
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Security concerns are also present with this type of setup. The aircraft are connected to 
the ground operator via Datalink software, which is a high-speed and real time indicator of 
aircraft location and performance specifications (Bassien-Capsa, Lim, Liu, Ramasamy, & 
Sabatini, 2017). If this software is subject to hacking and cyber-attacks, it could open the door 
for a new level of terrorism. While this particular issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it does 
introduce serious concerns that will require heavy and continuous testing to ensure that such 
events are unlikely to occur. 
  




 Single-pilot operations bring a unique prospect to the aviation industry, especially for 
airlines that are desperately in need of countering the effects of the pilot shortage. While 
functionality-wise the proposed system implementation that would accommodate SPO is more 
than capable of handling this task, the human factors impact would be too compromising to the 
safety and authority gradient of the flight. While in the technical tasks it provides for less of a 
demand on the part of the pilot, the psychological repercussions make way for greater levels of 
ambiguity and uncertainty. If the pilot does not know where the true authority lies while 
conducting the flight, this makes way for a breakdown in trust. Without trust, the cohesive bond 
between man and man, or man and machine, is shattered. The level of performance thus 
deteriorates and flight safety and efficiency suffer. If this technology is ever to be implemented, 
it would require the conservation of this sturdy and effective, yet ever so fragile trust. 
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